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The security of quantum key distribution(QKD) protocols hinges upon features of physical systems
that are uniquely quantum in nature. We explore the role of quantumness as qualified by quantum
contextuality, in a QKD scheme. A new QKD protocol based on the Klyachko-Can-Biniciog˘lu-
Shumovsky(KCBS) contextuality scenario using a three-level quantum system is presented. We
explicitly show the unconditional security of the protocol by a generalized contextuality monogamy
relationship based on the no-disturbance principle. This protocol provides a new framework for
QKD which has conceptual and practical advantages over other protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
The existence of pre-defined values for quantum ob-
servables that are independent of any measurement set-
tings, has been a matter of debate ever since quan-
tum theory came into existence. While Einstein made
a case for looking for hidden variable theories that would
give such values [1], the work of John Bell proved that
such local hidden variable theories cannot be compati-
ble with quantum mechanics [2]. This points towards
a fundamental departure of the behaviour of quantum
correlations from the ones that can be accommodated
within classical descriptions. While the departure from
classical behaviour indicated by Bell’s inequalities re-
quires composite quantum systems and the assumption
of locality, the contradiction between assignment of pre-
defined measurement-independent values to observables
and quantum mechanics, goes deeper and was brought
out more vividly by the discovery of quantum contex-
tuality [3]. In a non-contextual classical description, a
joint probability distribution exists for the results of any
joint measurements on the system, and the results of a
measurement of a variable do not depend on other com-
patible variables being measured. Quantum mechanics
precludes such a description of physical reality; on the
contrary in the quantum description, there exists a con-
text among the measurement outcomes, which forbids us
from arriving at joint probability distributions of more
than two observables. Given a situation where an ob-
servable A commutes with two other observables B and
C which do not commute with each other: a measure-
ment of A along with B and a measurement of A along
with C, may lead to different measurement outcomes for
A. Thus, to be able to make quantum mechanical predic-
tions about the outcome of a measurement, the context
of the measurement needs to be specified.
The first proof that the quantum world is contextual,
was given by Kochen and Specker and involved 117 dif-
ferent vectors in a 3-dimensional Hilbert space [3]. Sub-
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sequently, the number of observables required for such a
‘no-coloring’ proof was brought down to 31 by Conway
and Kochen [4], while Peres provided a compact proof
based on cubic symmetry using 33 observables [5]. In
higher dimensions the number of observables can be fur-
ther reduced and more compact proofs are possible [6, 7].
Klyachko et. al. found a minimal set of 5 observables
for a qutrit for which the predicted value for quantum
correlation exceeds the bound (the KCBS inequality) im-
posed by non-contextual deterministic models [8]. The
violation observed is state dependent and one can find
states that do not allow for stronger than classical corre-
lations for the same set of observables. A state indepen-
dent violation of a non-contextuality inequality implies
that stronger correlations than classical are possible for
all states for the same set of observables [9]. In a 3-
dimensional Hilbert space the minimum number of ob-
servables required to achieve such a violation is 13 [9, 10]
and can be brought down to 9 if one excludes the max-
imally mixed state [11]. Recently graph theory has also
been used to describe contextuality scenarios, where ver-
tices describe unit vectors and edges describe the orthog-
onality relationships between them [12, 13].
While at the level of individual measurements quantum
mechanics is contextual, the probability distribution for
an observable A does not depend upon the context and
is not disturbed by other compatible observables being
measured. This is called the ‘no-disturbance’ principle
and leads to interesting monogamy relations for contex-
tuality inequalities [14] similar to those obeyed by Bell-
type inequalities [15]. These monogamy relations are a
powerful expression of quantum constraints on correla-
tions without involving a tensor product structure, and
we shall exploit them in our work.
Non-trivial quantum features of the world play an im-
portant role in quantum information processing [16] and
in particular in making the QKD protocols [17] funda-
mentally secure as opposed to their classical counter-
parts [18–20]. QKD protocols can be categorized into
two distinct classes, namely the ‘prepare and measure
schemes’, and the ‘entanglement assisted schemes’. In
the prepare and measure schemes whose prime example
is the BB84 [21] protocol, one party prepares a quantum
state and transmits it to the other party who performs
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2suitable measurements to generate a key. On the other
hand, the entanglement assisted protocols utilize entan-
glement between two parties and a prime example of such
a protocol is the Ekert protocol [22]. One distinct advan-
tage in the entanglement assisted QKD protocols is the
ability to check security based on classical constraints on
correlations between interested parties via Bell’s inequal-
ities. It has also been shown that any two non-orthogonal
states suffice for constructing a QKD protocol [23]. The
idea has been extended to qutrits [24] to allow four mu-
tually unbiased bases for QKD. Quantum cryptography
protocols have been proven to be robust against eaves-
dropping and noise [18–27].
Our focus in this work is to explore the utility of quan-
tum contextuality for QKD. While contextuality has al-
ready been exploited for QKD [28], we propose a new
QKD protocol which is based on the KCBS scenario and
the related monogamy relationships [8, 14]. Our proto-
col falls in the class of ‘prepare and measure schemes’ but
still allows a security check based on conditions on corre-
lations shared between the the two parties Alice and Bob.
In fact in our protocol it is the monogamy relation of the
KCBS inequality which is responsible for unconditional
security.
We first devise a QKD protocol between Alice and
Bob utilizing the KCBS scenario of contextuality as a
resource with post-processing of outcomes allowed on Al-
ice’s site. Considering Eve as an eavesdropper and using
the novel graph theoretic approach [12, 14] we then de-
rive an appropriate monogamy relation between Alice-
Bob and Alice-Eve correlations for the optimal settings
of Eve. From this monogamy relationship, we then ex-
plicitly calculate the bounds on correlation to be shared
among Alice and Bob demonstrating the security of the
protocol. Our protocol enjoys a distinct advantage of
not employing entanglement as a resource which is quite
costly to produce, and still allows for a security test based
on the KCBS inequality which is analogous to Bell-like
test for security available for the entanglement based pro-
tocols. Further, it can be transformed into an entangle-
ment assisted QKD protocol by making suitable adjust-
ments. Although our protocol is not device independent,
it adds a new angle to the QKD protocol research.
The material in the paper is arranged as follows: In
Section II we provide a brief review of the KCBS in-
equality. In Section III A we describe our protocol, in
Section III B we derive the monogamy relations for the
required measurement settings and in Section III C we
discuss the security of the protocol. Section IV offers
some concluding remarks.
II. KCBS INEQUALITY
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FIG. 1. The KCBS orthogonality graph. Each vertex cor-
responds to a projector and the edge linking two projectors
indicates their orthogonality relationship.
The KCBS inequality is used as a test of contextuality
in systems with Hilbert space dimension three and more.
In this section we review two equivalent formulations of
the inequality, one of which will be directly used in our
QKD protocol to be described later.
Consider a set of five observables which are projec-
tors in a 3-dimensional Hilbert space. The projectors
are related via an orthogonality graph as given in Fig-
ure 1. The vertices in the graph correspond to the pro-
jectors, and two projectors are orthogonal to each other
if they are connected by an edge. A set of projectors
which are mutually orthogonal also commute pairwise
and can therefore be measured jointly. Such a set of co-
measurable observables is called a context. Therefore,
in the KCBS scenario, every edge between two projec-
tors denotes a measurement context and each projec-
tor appears in two different contexts. However, a non-
contextual model will not differentiate between different
contexts of a measurement and will deterministically as-
sign values to the vertices irrespective of the context.
A deterministic non-contextual model must assign a
value 0 or 1 to the ith vertex and therefore the probabil-
ity that the vertex is assigned a value 1, denoted by Pi,
takes values 0 or 1 (and the corresponding probability
for a vertex to have value 0 is 1 − Pi). In such a non-
contextual assignment the maximum number of vertices
that can be assigned the probability Pi = 1 (constrained
by the orthogonality relations), is 2 irrespective of the
state. Therefore,
K˜(A,B) =
1
5
4∑
i=0
Pi ≤ 2
5
. (1)
This is the KCBS inequality [8, 12], which is a state-
dependent test of contextuality utilizing these projectors,
and is satisfied by all non-contextual deterministic mod-
els. In a quantum mechanical description, given a quan-
3tum state and the projector Πi we can calculate the prob-
abilities Pi readily and it turns out that the sum total
probability can take values upto
√
5
5 >
2
5 , with the max-
imum value attained for a particular pure state. There-
fore, quantum mechanics does not respect non-contextual
assignments and is a contextual theory. In a more gen-
eral scenario, where one only uses the exclusivity princi-
ple [13] - that the sum of probabilities for two mutually
exclusive events cannot be greater than unity - one can
reach the algebraic maximum of the inequality namely,
Max
1
5
4∑
i=0
Pi =
1
2
. (2)
Unlike in inequality (1), here Pis can take continuous
values in the interval [0, 1]. The bounds so imposed by
non-contextuality, quantum theory and the exclusivity
principle can be identified with graph theoretic invariants
of the exclusivity graph of the five projectors, which in
this case is also a pentagon [12].
The correlation can be further analyzed if one considers
observables which take values Xi ∈ {−1,+1} and are
related to the projectors considered above as
Xi = 2Πi − I. (3)
One can then reformulate Eqn. (1) in terms of anti-
correlation between two measurements as [29]
K(A,B) =
1
5
4∑
i=0
P (Xi 6= Xi+1) ≤ 3
5
. (4)
Where i+ 1 is sum modulo 5 and P (Xi 6= Xi+1) denotes
the probability that a joint measurement of Xi and Xi+1
yields anti-correlated outcomes. Eqn. (4) is obeyed by
all non-contextual and deterministic models. However,
quantum theory can exhibit violation of the above in-
equality. The maximum value that can be achieved in
quantum theory is for a pure state and turns out to be
1
5
4∑
i=0
PQM(Xi 6= Xi+1) = 4
√
5− 5
5
>
3
5
. (5)
It should be noted that the maximum algebraic value
of the expression on the left hand side of the KCBS in-
equality as formulated in Eqn. (4) is one. We shall use
this formulation of the KCBS inequality directly in our
protocol in the next section as it allows evaluation of
(anti-)correlation between two joint measurements.
III. THE QKD PROTOCOL, CONTEXTUALITY
MONOGAMY AND SECURITY
A. The protocol
In a typical key-distribution situation, two separated
parties Alice and Bob want to share a secret key securely.
They both have access to the KCBS scenario of five pro-
jectors. Alice randomly selects a vertex i and prepares
the corresponding pure state Πi and transmits the state
to Bob. Bob on his part, also randomly selects a vertex j
and performs a measurement {Πj , I −Πj} on the state.
We denote i and j as the settings of Alice and Bob re-
spectively. The outcome of Bob’s measurement depends
on whether he ended up measuring in the context of Al-
ice’s state or not. The outcome Πj is assigned the value 1
and the outcome I−Πj is assigned the value 0. After the
measurement, Bob publicly announces his measurement
setting, namely the vertex j. Three distinct cases arise:
C1: i, j are equal(i = j): By definition Bob is assured
to get the outcome 1. Alice notes down a 0 with
herself and publicly announces that the transmis-
sion was successful. Both of them thus share an
anti-correlated bit.
C2: i, j are in context but not equal: Bob’s projector is
in the context of Alice’s state. Since the state Alice
is sending is orthogonal to Bob’s chosen projector,
he is assured to get the outcome 0. Alice then notes
down 1 with herself and publicly announces that
the transmission was successful and Bob uses his
outcome as part of the key. This way they both
share an anti-correlated bit. It should be noted
that Alice does not note down her part of the key
until Bob has announced his choice of setting.
C3: i, j are not in context: Bob’s projector does not
lie in the context of Alice’s state. Alice publicly
announces that the transmission was unsuccessful
and they try again. However they keep this data,
as it may turn out to be useful to detect Eve.
Using the protocol, Alice and Bob can securely share a
random binary key. Their success depends on chances
that Bob’s measurements are made in the context of Al-
ice’s state. Whenever Bob measures in the correct con-
text which happens three-fifths of the time, Alice is able
to ensure that they have an anti-correlated key bit. When
Bob measures in the same context but not the same pro-
jector as Alice, she notes down a 1 with herself and thus
they share a 1-0 anti-correlation. On the other hand,
when Bob measures the same projector as Alice’s state,
she notes down a 0 with herself and again they share a
0-1 anti-correlation. At no stage Alice needs to reveal her
state in public or to Bob. The QKD scenario is depicted
in Figure 2.
In the ideal scenario without any eavesdropper, Alice
and Bob will always get an anti-correlated pair of out-
comes and therefore will violate the KCBS inequality to
its algebraic maximum value which is one. It should be
noted that they are able to achieve the algebraic bound
because when Bob ends up measuring the same projec-
tor as Alice, she notes down 0 on her side which is not
the quantum outcome of her state. Thus this in no way
is a demonstration that quantum theory reaches the al-
gebraic bound of KCBS inequality which in fact it does
4not. However, in the presence of an eavesdropper the
violation of the KCBS inequality can be used as a test
for security as will be shown later. The presence of Eve
is bound to decrease the Alice Bob anti-correlation and
that can be checked by sacrificing part of the key.
The key as generated by the above protocol although
completely anticorrelated is not completely random,
there are more ones in the key than zeros. Therefore,
the actual length of the effective key is smaller than the
number of successful transmissions. In order to calculate
the actual key rate we compute the Shannon information
of the transmitted string. Given the fact that P0 =
1
3
and P1 =
2
3 for the string generated out of successful
transmission, the Shannon information turns out be
S = −P0 log2 P0 − P1 log2 P1 = 0.9183 (6)
The probability of success (i.e. when Bob chooses his
measurement in the context of Alice’s state) is 35 as stated
earlier. Thus the average key generation rate per trans-
mission can be obtained as 35S = 0.55. We tabulate the
average key rate of a few QKD protocols in the absence
of an eavesdropper in Table I.
QKD protocol Success probability Av. key rate in bits
(per transmission) (per transmission)
BB84 (2 basis) 1/2 0.50
BB84 (3 basis) 1/3 0.50
Ekert(EPR pairs) 1/2 0.50
3-State [24] 1/4 0.50
KCBS 3/5 0.55
TABLE I. The key rate for various QKD protocols in the ab-
sence of an eavesdropper. As can be seen the KCBS protocol
offers a little higher key rate compared to the other protocols.
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FIG. 2. Alice and Bob are trying to violate the KCBS inequal-
ity [K(A,B)], while Eve in her attempts to gain information
is trying to violate the same inequality with Alice [K(A,E)].
It is instructive to note that the above QKD protocol
can be transformed into an ‘entanglement assisted’ pro-
tocol, where Alice and Bob share an isotropic two-qutrit
maximally entangled state:
|ψ〉 = 1√
3
2∑
k=0
|kk〉. (7)
Alice randomly chooses a measurement setting i and im-
plements the measurement {Πi, I−Πi} on her part of the
entangled state. In the situation when she gets a posi-
tive answer and her states collapses to Πi Bob’s state
collapses to Πi too. This then becomes equivalent to the
situation where Alice prepares the state Πi and sends it
to Bob. The probability of this occurrence is 1/3. Bob
too randomly chooses a measurement setting j and im-
plements the corresponding measurement. The rest of
the protocol proceeds exactly as in the case of prepare
and measure scenario.
Although there are a number of possible choices for the
projectors Πi, we detail below a particular choice of vec-
tors |vi〉 (un-normalized) corresponding to the projectors
Πi, on which the above assertions can be easily verified.
|v0〉 =
(
1, 0,
√
cos
pi
5
)
|v1〉 =
(
cos
4pi
5
,− sin 4pi
5
,
√
cos
pi
5
)
|v2〉 =
(
cos
2pi
5
, sin
2pi
5
,
√
cos
pi
5
)
|v3〉 =
(
cos
2pi
5
,− sin 2pi
5
,
√
cos
pi
5
)
|v4〉 =
(
cos
4pi
5
, sin
4pi
5
,
√
cos
pi
5
)
(8)
With
Πi =
|vi〉〈vi|
〈vi|vi〉 , i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. (9)
Thus our ‘prepare and measure’ protocol can be trans-
lated into an ‘entanglement assisted’ protocol. We have
provided this mapping for the sake of completeness and
in our further discussions we will continue to consider the
prepare and measure scheme.
B. Contextuality monogamy
In quantum mechanics, given observables A,B,C, such
that A can be jointly measured both with B and C (i.e. it
is compatible with both) the marginal probability distri-
bution P (A) for A as calculated from both the joint prob-
ability distributions P (A,B) and P (A,C) is the same:∑
b
P (A = a,B = b) =
∑
c
P (A = a,C = c) = P (A = a).
(10)
This is called the ‘no-disturbance’ principle and it reduces
to the ‘no-signaling’ principle when the measurements B
and C are performed on spatially separate systems.
The ‘no-disturbance’ principle can be used to construct
contextuality monogamy relationships of a set of observ-
ables if they can be partitioned into disjoint subsets each
of which can reveal contextuality by themselves but can-
not be simultaneously used as tests of contextuality.
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FIG. 3. Joint commutation graph (top) of Alice-Bob KCBS
test (Thin-red) and Alice-Eve KCBS test (Thick-blue) and its
decomposition into two chordal subgraphs (below). Dotted
edges indicate commutation relation between two projectors
belonging to the two different KCBS tests. (color online)
Consider the situation where Alice and Bob are differ-
ent parties who make preparations and measurements as
detailed in Section III A. We consider the possibility of
a third party Eve who tries to eavesdrop on the conver-
sation between them. As will be detailed in Section III C
Eve will have to violate the KCBS inequality with Alice
to gain substantial information about the key.
We denote the Alice-Bob KCBS test by K˜(A,B) with
projectors {Πi} and Alice-Eve KCBS test by K˜(A,E)
with projectors
{
ΠEi
}
. We have assumed different pro-
jectors in the two KCBS tests for clarity in derivation of
a monogamy relationship, but essentially the measure-
ments to be performed by Eve would have to be the same
as that of Bob to mimic Alice and Bob’s KCBS scenario
as will be detailed in Section III C where we take up the
security analysis of our protocol. In this joint scenario
the Πthi projector is connected by an edge to Πi+1, Π
E
i+1,
Πi−1, ΠEi−1 and Π
E
i , where i + 1 and i − 1 are taken
modulo 5 and the presence of an edge denotes commu-
tativity between the two connected vertices. These re-
lationships follow from the fact that the projectors used
by Eve will follow the same commutativity relationships
as the original KCBS scenario. By introducing herself in
the channel, Eve has created an extended scenario which
will have to obey contextuality monogamy due to the
no-disturbance principle. The no-disturbance principle
guarantees that the marginal probabilities as calculated
from the joint probability distribution do not depend on
the choice of the joint probability distribution used.
We follow the graph theoretical approach developed to
derive generalized monogamy relationships based only on
no-disturbance principle in reference [14]. A joint com-
mutation graph representing a set of n KCBS-type in-
equalities each of which has a non-contextual bound α
gives rise to a monogamy relationship if and only if its
vertex clique cover number is n.α. The vertex clique
cover number is the minimum number of cliques required
to cover all the vertices of the graph and a clique is a
graph in which all non-adjacent vertices are connected
by an edge. The joint commutation graph considered in
the protocol resulting in the presence of Eve satisfies the
condition for the existence of a monogamy relationship
between Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve KCBS inequalities as
can be seen from Fig. 3.
In order to derive the monogamy relationship one
needs to identify m chordal sub-graphs of the joint com-
mutation graph such that the sum of their non-contextual
bounds is n.α. A chordal graph is a graph which does not
contain induced cycles of length greater than 3. As shown
in reference [14] a chordal graph admits a joint probabil-
ity distribution and therefore cannot violate a contextu-
ality inequality. To this end we identify the decompo-
sition of the joint commutation graph into two chordal
subgraphs such that each vertex appears at most once
in both the subgraphs, as shown in Fig. 3. Their max-
imum non-contextual bound will then be given by the
independence number of the subgraph. Therefore,
p(ΠE0 ) + p(Π2) + p(Π
E
1 ) + p(Π1) + p(Π
E
2 ) ≤ 2, (11)
p(Π0) + p(Π3) + p(Π
E
3 ) + p(Π4) + p(Π
E
4 ) ≤ 2. (12)
Adding and grouping the terms according to their respec-
tive inequalities (Eqn.(1)) and normalizing, we get
K˜(A,B) + K˜(A,E) ≤ 4
5
. (13)
If the projectors involved in the KCBS tests are trans-
formed according to Eqn.(3), then using the KCBS given
in Eqn.(4) the monogamy relationship reads as
K(A,B) +K(A,E) ≤ 6
5
. (14)
The relationship derived above follows directly from the
no-disturbance principle and cannot be violated. In other
words, the correlation between Alice and Eve is comple-
mentary to the correlation between Alice and Bob and
thus if one is strong the other has to be weak. One can
thus use this fundamental monogamous relationship to
derive conditions for unconditional security as will be
shown in the next section.
C. Security analysis
In this section we prove that the above QKD protocol
is secure against individual attacks by an eavesdropper
Eve. We first motivate the best strategy available to an
eavesdropper limited only by the no-disturbance princi-
ple. The best strategy would then dictate the optimal
settings to be used to maximize the information of Eve
about the key. We then prove unconditional security of
6the protocol based on monogamy of the KCBS inequality.
The analysis is inspired by the security proof for QKD
protocols based on the monogamy of violations of Bell’s
inequality [20].
Alice and Bob perform the protocol a large number of
times and share the probability distribution P (a, b|i, j),
which denotes the probability of Alice and Bob ob-
taining outcomes a, b ∈ {0, 1} when their settings are
i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} respectively. In the ideal case they
obtain a 6= b when j = i + 1, where addition is taken
modulo 5. However in the presence of Eve, the secrecy
of correlation between Alice and Bob has to be ensured
even if Eve is distributing the correlation between them.
On the other hand, Eve would like to obtain informa-
tion about the correlation between Alice and Bob and
the associated key. Eve can attempt to accomplish this
in several ways which might include intercepting the in-
formation from Alice and re-sending to Bob after gaining
suitable knowledge about the key. It could also be that
she is correlated to Alice’s preparation system or to Bob’s
measurement devices. In other words Eve has access to a
tripartite probability distribution P (a, b, e|i, j, k), where
Alice, Bob and Eve obtain outcomes a, b and e when
their settings are i, j and k respectively. It is required
that the marginals to this probability distribution corre-
spond to the observed correlation between Alice and Bob
as will be shown below. In general it is not easy to char-
acterize the strategy of an eavesdropper without placing
some constraints on her.
For the following security analysis we place fairly min-
imal restrictions on the eavesdropper. It is required of
her to obey the no-disturbance principle and as a con-
sequence her correlation with Alice will be limited by
monogamy (14). Such a constraint is well motivated be-
cause it is a fundamental law of nature and will have to
be obeyed at all times.
We assume that the correlation observed by Alice and
Bob, P (a, b|i, j) as defined above, is a consequence of
marginalizing over an extended tripartite probability dis-
tribution P (a, b, e|i, j, k), distributed by an eavesdropper
Eve:
P (a, b|i, j) =
∑
e
P (a, b, e|i, j, k)
=
∑
e
P (e|k)P (a, b|i, j, k, e).
(15)
Where the second equality is a consequence of the no-
disturbance principle: Eve’s output is independent of the
settings used by Alice and Bob. We can also analyze the
correlation between Alice and Eve in a similar manner:
P (a, e|i, k) =
∑
b
P (a, b, e|i, j, k)
=
∑
b
P (b|j)P (a, e|i, j, k).
(16)
Where the second equality also follows from the no-
disturbance principle and implies that Eve can decide on
her output based on the settings disclosed by Bob. Bob’s
outcome, however, cannot be used as it is never disclosed
in the protocol. The natural question that arises now is
how strong does the correlation between Alice and Bob
need to be such that the protocol is deemed secure. As
will be seen the question can be answered by monogamy
of contextuality.
The QKD scenario now is as follows: Alice and Bob
utilize the preparations and measurements as detailed in
Section III A, while an eavesdropper Eve limited only by
the no-disturbance principle is assumed to distribute the
correlation between them. Whenever Eve distributes the
correlation between herself and Alice she uses the same
measurement settings as Bob to guess the bit of Alice.
This way Eve can hope to gain some information about
the key. However, contextuality monogamy limits the
amount to which Eve can be correlated to Alice without
disturbing the correlation between Alice and Bob signif-
icantly as shown in Section III B.
The condition for a secure key distribution between
Alice and Bob in terms of Alice-Bob mutual information
I(A : B) and Alice-Eve mutual information I(A : E)
is [30]:
I(A : B) > I(A : E). (17)
For individual attacks and binary outputs of Alice it es-
sentially means that the probability PB that Bob guesses
the bit of Alice should be greater than the probability,
PE for Eve to correctly guess the bit of Alice. Thus the
above condition simplifies to [31]
PB > PE. (18)
Bob can correctly guess the bit of Alice with probability
PB = K(A,B). For K(A,B) = 1 Bob has perfect knowl-
edge about the bit of Alice while for K(A,B) = 0 he has
no knowledge. For any other values of K(A,B) they may
have to perform a security check.
We assume that Eve has a procedure that enables her
to distribute correlation according to Eqns. (15-16). The
procedure takes an input k among the five possible in-
puts according to the KCBS scenario and outputs e. She
uses this outcome to determine the bit of Alice when Al-
ice’s setting was i. The probability that Eve correctly
guesses the bit of Alice is denoted by Pik. Since there
are 5 possible settings for Alice and Eve each, the aver-
age probability for Eve to be successful PE is,
PE =
1
15
4∑
i=0
(Pii + Pii+1 + Pii−1)
≤ max{Pii, Pii+1, Pii−1|∀ i}. (19)
The terms in the above equation denote the success prob-
ability of Eve when she uses the same setting as Alice and
when she measures in the context of Alice, respectively.
For all other cases she is unsuccessful. Without loss of
generality we can assume that P01 is the greatest term
appearing in Eqn (19). This corresponds to the success
7probability of Eve when her setting is 1 and Alice’s set-
ting is 0. However, Alice’s setting is not known to Eve as
it is never disclosed in the protocol. Therefore the best
strategy that Eve can employ is to always choose her
setting to be 1 irrespective of Alice’s settings and try to
violate the KCBS inequality with her. The probabilities
that appear in the KCBS inequality would then be,
P (a 6= e|i = 0, k = 1) = P01 = P01,
P (a 6= e|i = 1, k = 1) = P11 = 1− P01,
P (a 6= e|i = 2, k = 1) = P21 ≤ P01,
P (a 6= e|i = 3, k = 1) = P31 ≤ P01,
P (a 6= e|i = 4, k = 1) = P41 ≤ P01. (20)
The probability for Eve to get a particular outcome is in-
dependent of Alice’s choice of settings. Her best strategy
to eavesdrop can at most yield all the preceding probabili-
ties to be equal (except the second term which will show a
correlation instead of the required anti-correlation) which
will maximize K(A,E). Evaluating the KCBS violation
for Alice and Eve, we get,
K(A,E) =
3
5
P01 +
1
5
>
3
5
PE +
1
5
. (21)
Using the monogamy relationship given by Eqn. (14), we
get,
3
5
PE +
1
5
≤ 6
5
− PB. (22)
For the protocol to work Eqn. (18) must hold and the
above condition implies that it happens only if
K(A,B) >
5
8
. (23)
Therefore the protocol is unconditionally secure if Alice
and Bob share KCBS correlation greater than 58 . It is
worth mentioning that 58 is lesser than the maximum
violation of the KCBS inequality in quantum theory.
As shown in reference [14] the monogamy relation (14)
is a minimal condition and no stronger conditions ex-
ist. This implies that any QKD protocol whose security
is based on the violation of the KCBS inequality can-
not offer security if the condition given in Eqn. (23) is
not satisfied. This quantifies the minimum correlation
required for unconditional security. We conjecture that
no key distribution scheme based on the violation of the
KCBS inequality can perform better than our protocol
since we utilize post-processing on Alice’s side to extend
the maximum violation of the KCBS inequality upto its
algebraic maximum.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The cryptography protocol we presented is a direct
application of the simplest known test of contextuality
namely the KCBS inequality and the related monogamy
relation. For the protocol to work, Alice and Bob try to
achieve the maximum possible anti-correlation amongst
themselves. They achieve the algebraic maximum of the
KCBS inequality by allowing post-processing on Alice’s
site. We then showed that any eavesdropper will have
to share a monogamous relationship with Alice and Bob
severely limiting her eavesdropping. For this purpose we
derived a monogamy relationship for the settings of Eve
which allow her to gain optimal information. We found
that the optimal information gained by Eve cannot even
allow her to maximally violate the KCBS inequality as
allowed by quantum theory. Such an unconditional se-
curity provides a significant advantage to our protocol
since it does not utilize the costly resource of entangle-
ment. Furthermore, being a prepare and measure scheme
of QKD it also allows for a check of security via the vi-
olation of the KCBS inequality much like the protocols
based on the violation of Bell’s inequalities. Finally, we
note that our protocol is a consequence of contextuality
monogamy relationship, which are expected to play an
interesting role in quantum information processing.
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